ArchiveThe Caucasus Conflict and its Implications for European Security
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Crisia Miroiu
Abstract
The Caucasus conflict and its Implications for European Security is a conflict analysis’ paper, aiming to provide a complete understanding of the 2008 conflict by examining its roots within the Russian – Georgian relations since Georgia won its independence and to emphasize its implications for the European security. Mainly, the article analyzes Russia’s military and economic policies concerning Georgia (CIS’ treatises, electric power and gas supplies issues, the ban on Georgian’ wines and others), as well as Georgia’s internal politics and conflicts (Georgian intern leadership power struggles, Ajarian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian internal conflicts). Also, the article is focusing on other international political actors’ policies concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia (other states from the Black Sea area: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria; USA; international organization: NATO, EU, UN, OSCE). A brief account of the conflict is also related, as evaluation-free as possible. The international reactions to the conflict (EU’s summits, France – Sarkozy’s mediation, USA, other states) are strongly emphasized, suggesting also conflict’s implication and its future consequences for the European security.
The 2008 “Five-Day” War shook the fragile equilibrium in Caucasus and provoked an international crisis. It started from a local crisis in South Ossetia and, prompted by Russia’s decision to intervene with massive military forces and punish Georgia for its internal politics, it quickly escalated into an international conflict.
Georgia declared its independence short time before the collapse of the USSR, on April 9, 1991. During the ‘90s, Georgia endured severe political instability, economic crisis and civil unrest, particularly within the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Elected President in 1995, Eduard Shevardnadze, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, dictated a strong pro-Russian foreign policy. After the 2003 Rose Revolution, he was displaced by the Westward looking Mikheil Saakashvili. Under Saakashvili, Georgia reoriented its foreign policy and initiated limited democratic reforms and development.
Economically and military impuissant after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a weakened Russia lost its hegemonic role and its power status in the ‘90s. However, increased demand for and development of its oil and natural gas reserves contributed to rapid economic growth in the aftermath of the 1999 financial crisis, leading Russia to become more confident and assertive in international politics.
Concerned about imposing its leadership and supremacy in the post-Soviet space, Russian government remained deeply suspicious of Georgia’s intention of developing closer ties with the NATO or the EU. Once it had the chance, Russia aggressively intervened in Georgia’s internal affairs.
The recent events in the Caucasus proved that existing international structures – the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – were unable to prevent such conflicts and suggest a need for new security architecture. Also, the events of Caucasus hide frozen conflicts and old tensions between the West and Georgia, on one side, and Russia, on the other side, deeply rooted in geo-political, ethnic and economic interests.
