Home Current Issue

Archive


 
Parliaments and legislatures are surprising institutions. Other core political institutions, such as armies and administrative bodies, have hierarchical structures, and therefore utilize a top-down model for their decision-making processes. This guarantees their cohesiveness under pressure and great efficiency in dealing with the issues at hand. Representative bodies, such as parliaments and legislatures, operate quite differently. These are meant to contain intense social conflicts and fierce political disputes within themselves. Developed legislatures are well equipped with rules and processes that allow them to deal with multiple cleavages in societies and channel conflicts among different groups within existing legislative frameworks. They must do so without putting at risk the stability of the overall system. Failure of a legislature to do so can lead to the collapse or paralysis of a system and the consequent inability of a government to function. Equally remarkable is their ability to integrate, and even to tame, protest movements and fundamentalist leaders of all kinds. 
 
 
 
Many attempts have been made, and will certainly be made in the future, at building up viable parliamentarianism. Some failed, like in many African and some East European countries, while others succeeded, and even as easily as in those five East German states that formerly were known as the German Democratic Republic. How can we understand in a generalizing way what is going on when a parliament is being ‘institutionalized’ and is developing (or ‘evolving’) thereafter? To answer this question, a new theory of institutionalization and institutional development is sketched out (i.e. ‘Evolutionary Institutionalism’). In addition, its heuristic and explanatory value is demonstrated in an analysis of how state parliaments in East Germany were institutionalized after 1990.
 

 
To what extent does judicial activism contribute to or detract from the process of building democracy? Although there has been a growing literature on the effects of other institutional actors on democracy building and democratic consolidation (such as presidentialism, multipartism, and the drafting of electoral laws) there has been remarkably little work done that investigates the impact of judicial action. This paper argues that the actions of the courts early during the course of the transition from communism, helped set the stage for political developments later. In this paper, we explore the impact of judicial activism during the first years after the transition from communist rule, while controlling for other institutional factors, such as the extent of presidential power, and electoral system design, on democratic consolidation in nine post communist countries. We compare the rates at which constitutional courts intervened in the political process, specifically in the areas of elections, the internal rules of government institutions, and the balance of power among government institutions and how this related to the early progress of democracy in each country in the first years following the transition from communist rule. 
 
 
 
The success of the extreme right in many countries was perhaps the most remarkable result of the recent European Parliamentary Election in 2009. We have the ambition to understand why people cast their ballots to the radical right (Jobbik) in Hungary. Our hypotheses are based on the international literature and the assumptions of public discourse. The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First we carry out a panel data analysis in which we chart the social background and motivation of the Jobbik-voters. We conclude that social frustration has only marginal, whereas anti-establishment attitude, nationalism and anti-Roma sentiments have much more significant impact on the preference for Jobbik. In the second part of our analysis we try to answer the fundamental question: Why did the breakthrough of Jobbik happen just now when anti-Roma attitudes have existed for many decades? Using content-analysis data we demonstrate that the Roma-problem strongly determined the political agenda which was a very favourable phenomenon for Jobbik. Although the party and its politicians had only very limited coverage due to issue-ownership the media yet contributed to the success of Jobbik by highlighting the issues related to Roma population.
 
 
 
This article contributes to the discussion of regionalism in Ukraine and its role in Ukrainian politics. Ukraine presents a rather unique case in postcommunist history, where the presence of a large Russian ethnic group has not been associated with any major clashes between Russian and Ukrainian
ethnic groups, as in the majority of other post-communist countries. In search for an explanation of this rather unique regional development, this article analyzes dynamics of post-communist political institution building and the structure of legislative representation. It argues that the electoral connection can provide useful insight in this matter. Specifically, this article focuses on presence and work of the Parliamentary Party Groups (PPGs) in Ukraine. Ukrainian PPGs have regional connections, but these are more connections to economic or financial groups than ethnic electoral connections to regional groups. The article looks at the PPG recruitment patterns, including the dynamics of recruiting members from large enterprises.
 
More Articles...
<< Start < Prev 1 2 Next > End >>
Page 1 of 2
Partners
Banner
Sponsors
Banner